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FINANCIAL DEVICES FOR CONTROLLING OR MITIGATING
THE SEVERITY OF BUSINESS CYCLES
THOMAS SEWALL ADAMS
YALE UNWEILSITY
The distinctive evil of the business cycle is due to the abuse or misuse
of credit.At some point in the cycle, borrowers and buyers ask for
credit which in their own and the public interest should be refused.
To do this it is necessary (a) to find some practical test or index by which
to determine when the time for credit restriction has arrived; (b) to
devise some process or mechanism by which restriction can be exercised;
and (c) to select the men or agency of control upon which the responsi-
bility for initiating action may properly be placed.It is primarily to
these questions that the proposals discussed in this chapter are addressed.
I. PROPOSALS RELATING TO THECONTROLOF BANK CREDIT
A considerable measure of responsibility for the regulation or regulari-
zation of credit obviously rests upon the banks.Here fortunately the
discussion may start with an established principle.It has long been an
accepted rule of banking practice that interest rates should be increased
when there is danger of a panic; and this rule is commonly interpreted to
mean, under existing conditions in the United States, that the Federal
Reserve Banks should raise their discount rates sharply when the reserve
ratios established by law (35 per cent in lawful money against deposits
and 40 per cent in gold against federal reserve notes in circulation) are
threatened.
Recent experience seems to show that this rule is inadequate and
should, if possible, be amended or supplemented.
As a matter of business experience since the Armistice, the country
has passed through a brief period of falling prices; a boom in 1919 and
early 1920 which was characterized—to use the descriptive phrases
applied by the Federal Reserve Board'— by "over-extended business,"
a "mania for speculation," "unprecedented orgy of extravagance,"
and a period of painful prostration and reaction.But, it is significant to
note, we have passed through the crisis without a panic, without recourse
'Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board covering operations for the year
1920, p. 1.
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tothe emergency note provisions of the Federal Reserve Act, and without
material reduction of bank reserves below the legal minima. We have
stayed within thc established limits, and yet we have suffered.New
limits, new rules are obviously desirable.
Investigation seems to show that the introduction and amendment
of the Federal Reserve System has resulted in an enormous increase of
the amount of bank credit which may be based upon the given reserve of
gold, and that the stock of gold in this country has been abnormally
swollen as a result of the war.0. lYE. W. Sprague estimates that "the
available supply of credit was more than doubled as a result of the
establishment and operation of the reserve banks," and that "all future
additions to the stock of gold in this country will provide the basis
for at least twice as great an increment to the volume of credit as was
possible in the later years of the national banking system."
It is impracticable, within the space assigned to this chapter, to
follow in detail either the recent business and banking history of this
country, or the analysis which links that experience with the subject here
under discussion.They establish, however, in the opinion of the writer,
two facts of controlling importance for this chapter:
First, that as prevention is better than cure, any action which may properly
be taken to avert over-expansion of credit, should be taken before the legal
reserve ratios of the banks are actually threatened; that is, in the boom period
or prosperity phase of the cycle.
Second, that under existing conditions in this country, bank credit may
become harmfully over-extended while the reserves are still well above the legal
minima.Expressed concretely, the present reserve ratios of 35 and 40 per cent
are ineffective and misleading indicators of the time or condition at which
further extensions of credit should be discontinued.
The proposals to remedy this situation are as follows:
Adjusting discount rates in accordance with index numbers of pro-
duction, employment, prices, and profits.
The starting point of the recent discussion of this subject is found
in 0. M. W. Sprague's initial proposal that the discount rates of the
Federal Reserve Banks should be sharply raised, regardless of reserve
ratios when the capital and labor of the country are fully employed
and when, therefore, there can be little or no increase of Output in response
to the stimulus of additional credit and rising prices.The proposal is
based on the thought that credit is over-extended, not when the reserve
ratios are threatened, but when production has reached its peak and
further credit results principally in fruitless speculation.The suggested
method or mechanism is, not that discount rates should be based in any
definite mechanical way upon index numbers, but that the Federal
The Discount Policy of the Federal Reserve Banks, The American Economic
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Reserve Banks in the formulation of their credit policies should make
greater use than they have made in the past of those statistics which
indicate the development and probable culmination of a boom.
It is true that those statistics are imperfect and that our knowledge
of cyclical cartography is in dire need of improvement.It is also true
that many factors other than index numbers must be taken into account
in formulating a sound credit policy.But we should not use these
facts as a smoke screen behind which to dodge a question of principle.
The country knew with sufficient certainty in 1919 that it was in the
midst of an inflationistic boom. We shall probably recognize the next
boom when we meet it.When it arrives, will those who control the
actions of the Federal Reserve Banks act to restrict credit when credit
expansion begins to do its destructive work, or will they wait until the
credit of the Federal Reserve Banks shows signs of exhaustion?
The proposal here under consideration has the great merit of stating
that issue in an unescapable way, and in emphasizing the responsibility
of the Federal Reserve Banks for cooperating actively in the development
of what has been called above "cyclical cartography."The proposal,
however, is essentially a graphic statement rather than a solution of the
problem, and Mr. Sprague now regards it "as a matter of secondary
importance, and in peace-time cycles probably, only of cautionary
value."lAs a solution it is not only subject to the limitations noted
above, but it exaggerates the power of an increase in discount rates to
restrict credit, and suggests a method of regulation which would possibly
encounter grave political opposition.
Raising thelegal reserve requirements against federal reserve
notes and deposits.
If the present reserve ratios are misleading guides to a sound credit
policy, because under existing conditions they make possible an over-
expansion of bank credit, an obvious suggestion is to raise the ratios.
Such a suggestion has been made by Mr. Sprague.
A reserve ratio of 50 per cent or even 60 per cent would permit much more
additional credit expansion than was possible under the national banking system,
and quite as much as could be advantageously employed.2
This, however, proposes to limit rather than to regulate or control
credit expamsion, and is only to be considered in the event that more
elastic and adaptable measures of regulation are found to be imprac-
ticable.Devices which would in effect raise the note-reserve ratio, how-
ever, have been suggested by many authorities, and must be regarded as
important possible means of restricting credit expansion.Thus, R. C.
Leffingwell proposes to restore gold and gold certificates to circulation
'From a letter to the writer.
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and thus recreate the "greatly depleted secondary reserve."A similar
idea forms an integral part of the important proposal of A. C. Miller,
next to be considered.
Increasing the sensitiveness of the deposit—reserve ratios of the
Federal Reserve Banks.
A. C. Miller of the Federal Reserve Board proposes not to abandon the
reserve ratio, but to make it a safer and more sensitive guide to a sound
credit policy.He suggests not a device but a detailed plan of procedure
which can be best explained in his own words:
The main change in the published weekly statement of the Federal Reserve
Banks that would be necessary would be to report the specific note reserve,
held by the Federal Reserve Agent, and the specific deposit reserve, held by the
bank.
The existing gold holdings of the reserve banks should be reapportioned
between the deposit reserve and the note reserve.To the deposit reserve might
be allocated an amount of reserve money equivalent, say, to 45 per cent of their
deposit liabilities as of the date when the new form of accounting would become
effective.To the note reserve should be allocated all the remaining reserve,
and, as the law requires, be in the form of gold.
The reserve thus allocated to the deposit reserve .should be regarded as the
working reserve of the banking or discount department of the Federal Reserve
Bank.The banks should be expected to conduct their discount operations on the
basis of this reserve.Until conditions justified, the amount of this reserve
should not be changed.Fresh accessions of gold received by the banking depart-
ment should be transferred to the note reserve by way of substitution for other
collateral held by the Federal Reserve Agent, or in exchange for federal reserve
notes.Withdrawals of gold from Federal Reserve Banks for foreign shipment
should, for the present at least, be taken out of the note reserve by the presentation of
federal reserve notes for redemption in gold or by the substitution of commercial
collateral for gold in the security held by the FedeEal Reserve Agent.
While the deposit reserve under the arrangement proposed above would
be constant, the deposit reserve ratio would not be constant, but would fluctuate.
Any expansion of the loan account of the Federal Reserve Banks would quickly
reflect itself in the diminution of the reserve ratio below 45 per cent; any diminu-
tion of their loan account would quickly reflect itself in an increase of the reserve
ratio above 45 per cent.In brief, fluctuations in the reserve ratio would reflect
quickly and accurately changes in the volume of the reserve banks' discounts.
From time to time the situation of the reserve banks as a whole, and of the several
reserve banks individually, should be reviewed in the light of current credit conditions
and needs in order to determine whether any reapportionment of reserves should
be made; whether, e.g., anygivenbank should enlarge its deposit reserve at the expense
of its note reserve.
As a result, the reserve ratios of the Federal Reserve Banks would have a
meaning not now possessed by them.As the banking and business community
came to be educated to the new method of stating the position of the reserve
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ratio; that ratio would be the immediate gage of the banking and credit situa-
tion.As credit expansion was in process, that reserve ratio would decline much
more rapidly than it now does.It would be a faithful indicator of what was
going on.It would rise only in reaction to a decline in the rate of expansion or as
liquidation was in process.Moreover, as the community came to appreciate
the significance of changes in the deposit ratio, that ratio would come to be
regarded with heightened interest because of the evident bearing in the logic of
reserve banking, of changes in the reserve ratio upon credit and discount policy.
And thus would the problem of credit administration also be simplified and its
solution be aided by anticipatory action, both on the part of the banks and on
the part of the borrowing community.
The note reserve ratio, under the scheme of operation here under considera-
tion, would have real significance as indicating the extent of the gold cover against
federal reserve notes.Fluctuations in the note reserve ratio would indicate
the increase or decrease of federal reserve notes outstanding, movements of gold
into and Out of the Federal Reserve System, and reapportionment of existing gold
holdings between the deposit reserve and the note reserve.'
Mr. Miller's proposal is largely educational in purpose.It eschews
mechanical controls and trusts that the deposit reserve, having been
disentangled from its present misalliance with the note reserve, public
opinion, and the "live judgment" of the federal reserve banker, will do
their appointed work of "regulating the flow and volume of credit with
regard to the trend of business and the volume of banking."
There is something disappointingly vague about regulation "with
regard to."Does it look towards preventing the over-extension of credit
or merely preventing the exhaustion of credit?Doubtless we must
renounce all hope of finding a neat little clockwork device which will
automatically raise discount rates as we approach the crest of a boom,
but men, particularly public officials, need the help of rule-of-thumb
devices which, like alarm clocks, announce the hour when they ought to
wake up.Political exigency may make it impracticable to get up at
that moment but the clock is nevertheless serviceable.Mr. Miller shows
hpw the clock, which has not been keeping time accurately, may be
repaired.But he does not give it an alarm bell.
The management of the reserves, under Mr. Miller's plan, would
involve the exercise of a large degree of discretionary control.Certain
aspects of the procedure (italicized by the writer in the quotation) have
an air of unreality. A temporary fixity is to be imparted to the deposit
reserve, but at indefinite times by indefinite authorities (possibly on the
initiative of the Federal Reserve Banks with the approval of the Board),
the deposit reserve might be increased by transfers from the note reserve
"in order to give the bank an enlarged basis of lending."This feature,
if its weakness may fairly be tested by a touch of caricature, seems a little
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likeplay—let us play that the deposit reserve is fixed, it being understood
that when the ratio approaches the legal minimum, new reserves will be
brought up from the note department.There is virtue in some forms
of play (as in discretionary control), but it is doubtful whether this partic-
ular device or procedure could secure the legislative sanction which its
introduction would probably require.And a similar verdict must be
reached with respect to the proposed management of the note reserve.
It is avowedly an attempt to approximate the machinery and procedure
employed by the Bank of England before the war.Whatever the merits
of that procedure, and they are great, the Federal Reserve System has been
constructed on a different theory and it is highly improbable that the sys-
tern could be revised in the approximate future with the purpose of so
handling withdrawals of gold that they would exercise the maximum
restrictive effect upon the supply of bank credit.
Great importance attaches to Mr. Miller's simble proposal that the
specific deposit reserve and ratio be separately stated, particularly in view
of his opinion that this is contemplated by the Federal Reserve Act.
In addition, it would probably be comparatively easy for the Federal
Reserve Banks to compute and publish nearly all the significant figures and
ratios which would result if Mr. Miller's plan were adopted.The gold
holdings of the banks could be constructively or statistically reapportioned.
Thereafter figures could be prepared on this basis and the resulting ratios
published with such comment or action as they seemed to require.To
the extent that we are to put our trust in the philosophy that to be
free we only need to know the truth, the problem would seem to be soluble
without fundamental changes in the banking law.
II. PROPOSALS RELATING TO GRANTING OR ASKING FOR CREDITS—
SELECTIVE CREDIT CONTROL
While the discount rate of the Federal Reserve Banks "is an indis-
pensable factor in the regulation and control of credit. . .thecondi-
tions that make this traditional control effective do not all exist at the
present time."t And the limitations upon its efficiency are not all tem-
porary. A general elevation of the level of discount rates—even when
control by a central banking system is sufficient to accomplish that—is
too undiscriminating to serve as a complete or perfect method of regula-
tion.In boom, periods, its blanket quality, or its wet-blanket quality,
serves properly to discourage or postpone the financing of many projects
which under other conditions would be plainly entitled to credit assis-
tance.But it fails to repress the speculator feverishly bent on anticipating
an expected jump in prices.Consideration of these serious limitations
upon the rediscount rate as an instrument of control has led naturally to
1AnrnwlReport of the Federal Reserve Board covering operations foryear 1919,
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proposals for decentralized control or what has been called above "selec-
tive credit."
Raising credit tests by commercial banks in periods of business
expansion.
This proposal, which also comes from the suggestive pen of 0. M. W.
Sprague, is that:
Commercial banks generally in analyzing credit should insist upon an improv-
ing ratio between current assets and current liabilities during periods of active
business and large profits.In general, the opposite condition has characterized
past practice.The average quality of both inventory and receivables deterio-
rates under the influence of a seller's market and rising prices.III those for whom
a ratio of two to one was adequate in 1916 had been required to show a higher
ratio, say, three to one, in 1919, it is certain that much of the credit expansion
of that year would not have occurred, and the cyclical fluctuations of the last
few years would have been less extreme.On account of the large number of
banks, this proposal may seem at first sight rather utopian, but it involves
nothing more than an extension of familiar practice, attacking the problem con-
cretely and from an angle with which both business men and bankers are familiar.'
Interpreted not as a method of external or compulsory control, but
as an educational device appealing both to the public spirit and the self-
interest of the banks, this proposal appears to have considerable merit.
Competing banks operated for profit could hardly be expected to curtail
loans in the earlier part of a boom.But it is in the latter part of the
boom period that credit restriction is most needed, and at that time it
becomes a profitable policy for the banks, or what is the same thing, a
policy which looks to the avoidance of loss.The efficacy of the proposal,
however, depends upon the success which the economists of the country
achieve in demarcating the prosperity phase of the cycle and determining
its approximate duration.If the banks can be convinced that within a
reasonably definite period a sharp shrinkage of business and values is to
be expected, credit expansion will be checked almost automatically.
Adjusting banking to the phases of the business cycle.
In the opinion of the writer practically all of the proposals which
have been made to regulate bank credit by a specific financial device
or mechanism err through over-simplification of the problem.Specific
devices have their value and function, for much the same reason that
the wise merchant does not omit to dress the windows of his store even
though he realizes that only a small fraction of his wares can be repre-
sented there.But the larger view, particularly in view of our imperfect
knowledge of the phases of the cycle, is to take not one test, but many
tests, of the time to act, and many lines, not one, of remedial action.A
more comprehensive description of the tests and remedies (which it may
From a letter to the writer.Compare 0. M. W. Sprague, Bank Management
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benoted are usually implicit in the minds of those who propose specific
devices) is given in the following statement by E. W. Kemmerer:'
Assume for example, that the evidence at a particular time shows we are
several years along on the risingcurveof a business cycle, that there has been no
substantial liquidation for two or three years, that speculative activity is running
high on the exchanges, that prices of the more speculative stocks are rising, that
bank clearings are large, that reserve ratios at Federal Reserve Banks and com-
mercial banks are tending downward, call and short-time interest rates and
Federal Reserve discount rates rising, the ratios of bank loans to deposits increas-
ing, credit becoming more and more extended, and that commercial failures for
some time have been running abnormally low, showing that little dead wood has
of late been cut out of the business structure.This, for example, is a substan-
tially correct picture of the year 1906, and of the latter part of 1919, and the
early part of 1920.
He adds that a prudent and far-sighted banker in these circumstances
would
probably try to get his assets in a more liquid condition.He would seli his less
gilt-edged securities while the seffing was good, and place the proceeds either in
the most gilt-edged securities on the market—the kind that ordinarily suffers
least in a period of crisis and that usually alone advances during the early part
of the ensuing depression—or he might purchase with the proceeds prime com-
mercial paper of short maturities, scattering well his risks.He would place
a larger proportion of his resources in the best commercial paper of concerns
outside of his own community whose businesses were of the kinds least affected
by crises—concerns whose paper he would have no responsibility to renew at
maturity.He would clean up his loan accounts with his Federal Reserve Bank
and with his correspondent banks, and strengthen his reserve position.He would
get a larger proportion of his paper into short maturities and would bring pres-
sure to reduce his "capital loans," the kind that have formed the "renewal habit."
The general plan of action that he adopted for himself he would suggest to
many of his customers.He might be premature in his action; if so, he could
console himself with the thought that it is better to be safe than to be sorry,
that he moved in the right direction, and that the very prematurity of himself
and of others who acted like him contributed towards stabilizing the situation.
Adjusting the commitments and financial activities of business
concerns to the phases of the cycles.
The conditions which make it expedient for banks to restrict credit,
make it equally expedient in general for business concerns to refrain from
seeking or using credit.This obvious aspect of the subject is noted only
to record the fact that some American business concerns have found, it
both practical and profitable to adjust their financial operations to the
phases of the cycle.But that topic is covered in other chapters.
1TheBusiness Cycle(publishedby the New York Evening Post), 1921,pp.14-15.270 BUSINESSCYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
ilL PROPOSALS TO STABILIZE THE DOLLAR
A complete survey of the devices suggested for mitigating the severity
of business cycles would include an examination of various plans pro-
posed for stabilizing the purchasing power of the dollar, particularly
Irving Fisher's carefully elaborated plan to adjust the amount or
weight of the gold bullion in the dollar in accordance with the deviations
from par of an index number of representative commodity prices.These
proposals, despite weighty opinion to the contrary, seem to be entirely
relevant to the subject here under discussion.If introduced and suc-
cessfully operated the price level would remain approximately constant;
i.e., the range and significance of price fluctuations would be greatly
reduced, and in any future period of time the number of rising prices
would be substantially balanced by an equal number of falling prices.
One of the principal causes of business cycles, the contemporaneous rise
of most prices (and the expectancy thereof) would therefore be removed
or essentially modified.
A discussion of these plans would carry the present chapter beyond the
limits assigned to it.Most of them are described in Mr. Fisher's
book "Stabilizing the Dollar" (particularly in Appendices III and VI),
and more recent plans will be found in Carl Strover's "Monetary Recon-
struction" and in Representative T. Alan Goldsborough's bill to stabilize
prices "by controlling the quantity of money and credits in relation to
the volume of trade by mereasing or diminishing that quantity as the
average price level goes down or up."These plans, Mr. Fisher's
plan in particular, deserve thorough examination by every person whose
mind is practical enough to entertain the belief that some of the deeper
sources of cyclical disturbances may by time and thought be removed.
But they are impracticable at this time, because people believe them
impracticable—if for no other reason.They propose to lay hands upon
the economic holy-of-holies, and before they can be acted upon they will
require an amount of critical discussion commensurate with that which
should be given, say, to a proposal fundamentally to alter the marriage
relation.
* * *
Areview of the financial devices for controlling or mitigating the
severity of cycles which have been proposed, leads to the con-
clusion that there is no simple device which it is reasonable to insist
shall be employed by business men or by bankers for the purpose in view.
As we approach the crest of a boom in any particular trade or industry,
it is desirable that buying and commitments should be reduced, and
that to this end credit accommodation to that trade or industry should be
restricted.Such action, to business man and banker, represents not
1Froma speech by Representative Goldsborough in the House of Representatives,
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onlytheir self-interest, but their public obligation.But they must
first know, with that degree of precision and certainty required for busi-
ness action, that the trade or industry in question is actually approach-
ing the crest of a boom.The ways and means of controlling credit—
financial devices, in short—are thus subordinate to knowledge of the
cycle.The clearest duty of business man and banker is to assist in the
development of more accurate cyclical statistics.Plot the phases of the
cycle, and a combination of self-interest and vitalized public opinion will
force the application of the many remedies—not one remedy—which
common sense will show to be appropriate.To anticipate the cycle is to
neutralize it.